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Abstract. Lately, from a secure system providing adequate user’s protection of 
confidentiality and privacy, the mobile communication has been degraded to be 
a less trustful one due to the revelation of IMSI catchers that enable mobile 
phone tapping. To fight against these illegal infringements there are a lot of 
activities aiming at detecting these IMSI catchers. However, so far the existing 
solutions are only device-based and intended for the users in their self-
protection. This paper presents an innovative network-based IMSI catcher 
solution that makes use of machine learning techniques. After giving a brief 
description of the IMSI catcher the paper identifies the attributes of the IMSI 
catcher anomaly. The challenges that the proposed system has to surmount are 
also explained. Last but least, the overall architecture of the proposed Machine 
Learning based IMSI catcher Detection system is described thoroughly. 
Keywords: IMSI catcher detection, mobile phone tapping, phone 
eavesdropping, machine learning, anomaly detection. 
1 Introduction 
Until recently, mobile communication has been perceived by the majority of users 
as quite secure regarding both confidentiality and privacy thanks to the strong 
encryption combined with use of temporary identities. In fact, users quite often 
consider mobile telephony as more secure than fixed telephony. Recently, a series of 
scandalous phone tapping incidents in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany,  
China, etc. revealed by Snowden, a former American National Security Agency 
(NSA) agent had eroded this conviction. It is really shocking that not only very 
important people at high position like the German chancellor, prime ministers, 
members of parliament, etc. but also regular people may be victims of phone 
eavesdropping.  But most frightening lies perhaps in the fact that the monitoring may 
be done by anybody from the police, governmental intelligence agencies, security 
institutions, etc. to private companies or organisations. With advances in 
  
microelectronics and the availability of mobile open source software,  equipment used 
in phone tapping are getting both smaller, easier to handle, more available and also 
quite affordable in the range of US $1500-2000.  
Since the last couple of months, Aftenposten [1], one of the biggest newspapers in 
Norway has published several articles telling that they have detected the presence of 
many IMSI catchers aka fake base stations in the region of Oslo that could be used in 
the surveillance of mobile users. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 IMSI catchers detected around the Parliament in Oslo  
(courtesy: Aftenposten) 
The detection has been done using mobile devices such as GSMK Cryptophone [2] 
that the reporters carried with them when moving around in Oslo. In fact, the existing 
IMSI detection solutions are based on portable devices that monitor the radio access 
network to detect possible presence of IMSI catchers. There is today no network 
based solution to detect IMSI catchers and the reasons are twofold. First, the need for 
IMSI detection is so far non-existent because there are only a few IMSI catchers used 
by governmental agencies in the fight against crimes and terrorism. Secondly, mobile 
operators do not consider IMSI catchers as threats because they just monitor the 
users’ conversation and do not do any harm to their mobile networks. However, with 
the increasing number of mobile phone tapping incidents, the users start to lose 
confident in mobile communication and mobile operators begin to realise that 
something must be done. This paper introduces a Machine Learning based IMSI 
catcher Detection system that was initiated by the Telenor ImobSec project in 
collaboration with Norwegian universities and security experts. The paper begins with 
a review of related works. Next, a comprehensive explanation of the IMSI catcher is 
given. For the detection of IMSI catcher the attributes of the anomaly input data set 
are then identified and clarified.  The challenges to the proposed system are also 
analysed. The central part of the paper is the proposed Machine Learning based IMSI 
catcher Detection system which is described thoroughly. Further works are proposed 
in the conclusion. 
  
2 Related works 
There are currently several initiatives aiming at developing IMSI detection solutions 
and as the review in this section will show they are all mobile device based solutions. 
2.1 Security Research Labs (SRLabs) 
The SRLabs [3] in Berlin directed by the famous German Cryptographer and security 
scientist Karsten Nohl has conducted a few activities focused on the detection of 
mobile phone tapping. For the assessment of mobile network security SRLabs offers a 
set of tools.  
 
CatcherCatcher 
One of these tools is the CatcherCatcher tool which has the ability to detect mobile 
network irregularities suggestin a fake base station activity. The CatcherCatcher 
consists of: 
• Osmocom1 phone [4] 
• Osmocom cable 
• Linux computer 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 SnoopSnitch main Views 
SnoopSnitch 
SnoopSnitch is an Android application which by collecting and analysing wireless 
radio data, makes users aware of their mobile network security and warns them about 
possible threats such as fake base stations (IMSI catchers), user tracking and  Over 
The Air updates as shown in Figure 2. With SnoopSnitch users can both make use and 
contribute data to the GSM Security Map at gsmmap.org. 
 
                                                           
1  The Osmocom project is a family of projects that are related Open source mobile 
communications. Its provides software and tools for a variety of mobile communication 
standards, including GSM, DECT, TETRA and others. 
  
This application is currently working only on Android phones with a Qualcomm 
chipset and a stock Android ROM (or a suitable custom ROM with Qualcomm DIAG 
driver). Root privilege is required to capture mobile network data. 
2.2 Android IMSI-Catcher Detector (#AIMSICD) 
#AIMSICD [5] is an Android-based project originated from XDA forum2  with the 
goal of detecting and avoiding fake base stations (IMSI-Catchers) in GSM/UMTS 
networks which receives contributions from a large amount of anonymous and public 
Android developers, baseband hackers. All the developments are fully open source 
under GPL v3+ and located in an official GitHub repository. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 #AIMSICD main views: Main Screen, Cell Information, Database 
Viewer, Map Viewer (Courtesy: #AIMSICD) 
The project has achieved the following: 
• Main Views as shown in Figure 3: 
o Main Screen: Information about Device, Network and SIM-Card 
o Cell Information: Relevant variables using public AOS API calls 
(LAC, CID, Signal Strength) 
o Database Viewer: Data collected by the phone and from public DB 
of Cell Towers 
o Map Viewer: Shows Cell-Towers from the public database that are 
in your area 
• Functions: 
o Cell-Monitoring: Collects information about the cell towers you 
are/were connected to and saves it in the local database 
o Cell Tracking: Tracks your position while you are connected to the 
cell-tower and saves it with cell data in the local database 
o Download data from public cell-tower database (right now only 
from OpenCell_ID) 
                                                           
2  XDA Developer (also known simply as XDA; often denoted as xda-developers) is a mobile 
software development community of over 5 million members worldwide, started in January 
2003 
  
o Position Tracking: Using the GPS-Sensor and Google Location 
Service 
• Detection: 
o Check Cell_ID’s collected by the phone against public Cell-Tower 
Database. 
o Check for "Changing LAC" of each Cell-ID that is collected by the 
phone. 
2.3 SBA Research 
SBA Research is an Austrian research center for Information Security funded by 
the national initiative for COMET Competence Centers for Excellent Technologies. It 
enables the collaboration of 25 companies, 4 Austrian universities, one university of 
applied sciences, a non-university research institute, and many international research 
partners on challenges categorizing from organizational to technical security. SBA 
Research has two independent implementations of an IMSI Catcher Catcher (ICC). 
The first one employs a network of stationary (sICC) measurement units installed in a 
geographical area and constantly scanning all frequency bands for cell 
announcements and fingerprinting the cell network parameters. These rooftop-
mounted devices can cover large areas. The second implementation is an app for 
standard consumer grade mobile phones (mICC), without the need to root or jailbreak 
them [6]. 
3 Brief description of IMSI catcher 
An IMSI catcher is a device for intercepting GSM mobile phones. It subjects the 
phones in its vicinity to a Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack by pretending to be the 
preferred base station in terms of signal strength. 
 As its name tells, the IMSI catcher logs the IMSI numbers of all the mobile 
phones in the area, as they attempt to attach to the base station, and can determine the 
phone number of each individual phone. It also allows forcing the mobile phone 
connected to it to revert to A5/0 for call encryption (in other words, no encryption at 
all), making the call data easy to intercept and convert to audio. The phone calls can 
hence be tapped and recorded by the IMSI Catcher.  
This specific MITM attack was patented by Rohde & Schwarz, which presented 
the first IMSI Catcher GA 090 in Munich in 1996. On 24 January 2012, the Court of 
Appeal of England and Wales held that the patent is invalid for obviousness, since in 
reality it is just a modified cell tower with a malicious operator.   
The GSM specification requires the handset to authenticate to the network, but 
does not require the network to authenticate to the handset. This is obviously a 
weakness but GSM is a 26 years old technology and at its specification time it was 
almost impossible to have access to a false base station and a mutual authentication 
would be too heavy for the SIM card. IMSI catchers are employed by law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
  
To remedy the weakness of GSM, UMTS (3G) and LTE (4G) introduce mutual 
authentication, which requires also the authentication of base stations towards the 
mobile handset. Unfortunately, due to backward compatibility and the use of GSM as 
a fallback network where UMTS is not available, mobile phones can be forced to 
downgrade to a 2G connection and fully exposed to tapping [6]. 
  
 
  
 
Figure 4 Various current IMSI catchers (courtesy: #AIMSICD) 
As shown in Figure 4, not like the first generation IMSI catchers which were big, 
heavy and expensive, the current ones come in uncountable shapes, sizes and prices, 
and can be as tiny as the portable Septier IMSI-Catcher Mini. 
4 Detection of IMSI catcher 
To detect the presence of IMSI catcher it is necessary identify the anomalies in the 
mobile networks and to define the nature of anomaly detection input data set [7].  The 
outlier (anomaly) detection approach type 3 [8] is chosen since we already have a lot 
of knowledge about the mobile network. A few cases of IMSI catcher presence are 
considered to model anomalies and to define the input data set. 
4.1 Camping in 2G instead of 3G 
In many areas, especially the urban ones, 2G, 3G and 4G networks will quite often 
coexist to accommodate all kinds of handsets and subscriptions. A 3G enabled 
handset will normally connect itself to 3G networks since services with higher QoS 
could be provided. An IMSI catcher would jam the signals of the 3G base stations and 
force the mobile phone to disconnect from the original network and register to it. The 
IMSI catcher [9] acts as a base station toward the mobile station and as a mobile 
station toward the real base station as shown in Figure 5. The IMSI catcher can 
establish a regular connection with the mobile network using its own SIM or without 
a SIM. In the latter case, in the authentication process, the IMSI catcher simply 
forwards the authentication data received from the mobile terminal to the base station 
and conveys the data from the base station to the mobile phone. The session has to be 
conducted with disabled encryption in both ways since the IMSI catcher does possess 
the ciphering key Kc. 
Seen from the network anomalies created by the IMSI catcher in an area may have 
as a contextual attributes the percentage of mobile phones on 2G and the one of 
mobile phones on 3G. Indeed, a 2G percentage higher than average or a 3G 
  
percentage lower than average will be considered as contextual anomalies. Another 
contextual attribute is the percentage of 3G enabled mobile handset that together with 
the two previous ones constitute a collective anomaly. The anomaly model can be 
improved further by the addition of more attributes such as signal strength, antenna 
type (omnidirectional, sectorial), cell ID, cell size, etc. such that the detection can be 
improved and false positive reduced.  
 
 
Figure 5 Man-in-the-middle attack with an IMSI Catcher 
4.2 Temporary disappearance of mobile phones 
Quite often IMSI catchers have to jam all the signals in its vicinity. This will make 
the mobile stations around lose their connections to the mobile network. They will not 
be reached by the paging of the base station controller (BSC) at incoming calls 
addressed to them. The calls can hence not be delivered to the mobile phones as if 
they have moved to an area without coverage or if there are switched off or ran out of 
power. Anyway they seem to disappear from the network.  
The number of mobile phones that disappear for certain period of time from a 
network area will be used as a condition attribute for the IMSI catcher anomaly 
because a high value of disappeared mobile phones can indicate the possible presence 
of an IMSI catcher.  
4.3 Disabling of encryption 
Although not all the IMSI catchers the ones that do not use their own SIM to 
establish a connection to the mobile network, must disable encryption to tap the call 
since they do not have access to the ciphering key Kc.  Although they have lower 
  
probability to succeed due the security requirement at many mobile operators these 
IMSI catchers are still in operation in many countries. 
The number of call established with disable encryption can be used a contextual 
attribute for the IMSI catcher anomaly because a high value of calls with disable 
encryption can be an indication of the presence of an IMSI catcher. 
4.4 Challenges to the IMSI catcher anomaly 
Although using anomaly detection in the detection of IMSI catcher there are, 
however, a few challenges that need to be considered carefully as follows: 
 
Determination of the area for the IMSI catcher anomaly 
To determine the area for the collection of the input data set could be a challenging 
task because 2G (GSM), 3G (UMTS) and 4G (LTE) have different partitioning for 
location updating of the mobile phone. 
 
 
Figure 6 Geographical partitioning in UMTS 
A GSM network (2G) is divided into cells, which are grouped into a location Area 
(LA). A mobile phone in motion keeps the network informed about changes of the 
location area [10]. When moving from a cell belonging to a location area to another 
cell belonging to another location area, the mobile terminal has to perform a location 
area update to inform the network about the new location area in which it is located. 
A location area is usually managed by a base station controller (BSC) and could be a 
candidate for the data collection area. 
In a UMTS network (3G) a serving GPRS support node (SGSN) manages one or 
more Radio Network Controllers (RNC) and an RNC manages several Node B 
(equivalent to base station in GSM) [11]. 
To track the location of a UE (mobile phone) some geographical groups are 
defined within the UMTS Radio Access Network (UTRAN) as follows [12]: 
• Location Area (LA): covers the area of one or more Radio Network 
Controllers (RNC) managed by the same SGSN. 
• Routing Area (RA): is a subset of a LA. It only covers one RNC or even only a 
subset of an RNC. 
  
• UTRAN RA (URA): is a subset of an RA. It only covers multiple NodeBs of 
one RNC. 
LAs are used in the Circuit-Switched-domain and RAs in the Packet-Switched 
domain. As shown in Figure 6 Geographical partitioning in UMTS, a LA can have 
one or more RNC and one or more RA. An RA can have one or more URA. All the 
geographical partition may be considered as data collection area since the mobile 
station could be tracked in all of them. 
In an LTE network (4G) the cells (eNodeB) are grouped in Tracking Area (TA) 
used for paging of the UE (Mobile phone) [13]. Tracking areas can be grouped into 
lists of Tracking Areas (TA lists), which are administered by the User Equipment 
(UE). Tracking area updates are performed periodically or when the UE moves to a 
tracking area that is not included in its TA list. Mobile operators can allocate different 
TA lists to different UEs. By this way signaling peaks can be avoided in some 
conditions. For example, User equipment of train passengers may not perform 
tracking area updates simultaneously. The dimension of the TA compared to the LA 
depends on many factors like LTE paging capacity, TA update overhead, LA update 
overhead, etc. and could vary depending on the network. The Tracking Area (TA) 
may be considered as a data collection area because the mobile phone could be 
tracked in it. 
 
At the first glance, the Location Area of 2G is most suitable to be the data 
collection area but considerations have to be done when performing the mapping of 
Routing Area (RA), UTRAN (URA) and Tracking Area (TA) to LA because full 
match may not be achieved. 
 
Collection of data 
The attributes of the input data set for the IMSI catcher are operational data of the 
mobile networks.  They are collected, used and disposed within a period of time 
because they are huge in amount.  For a more permanent storage of these attributes 
upgrades on the mobile networks have to done and this could pose financial issues. 
The ultimate goal of the IMSI catcher detection system is to identify the fake base 
stations as quickly as possible. Since those base stations quite often are on the move 
the collection of data has to be done mostly in real time. This becomes a bigger 
challenge when the input data are collected from distributed network components. A 
solution could be a distributed system having a collection and detection function for 
each data collection area e.g. Location Area. 
5 The proposed Machine Learning based IMSI catcher 
Detection system 
To utilize and combine the previously mentioned contextual attributes for the 
detection of IMSI catcher we propose an innovative detection system based on 
machine-learning techniques which consists of two main parts as shown in Figure 7 
namely the online-detection part and the off-line learning part.  
 
  
 
 
Figure 7 The proposed Machine Learning based IMSI catcher Detection 
system 
 
As shown in Figure 7, the online-detection part contains different anomaly detectors, 
each of which uses a contextual attribute to define normal or abnormal behavior. For 
example, in our case we can have three different anomaly detectors. The first one is 
based on the change between 2G and 3G modes. The second one takes into account 
the temporary disappearance of mobile phones. The third one uses the disabling of the 
encryption. To combine these detectors, an ensemble detector is needed. A simplest 
form of the ensemble model is the majority voting between the different detectors but 
a weighted voting may also be considered in later phases. Several machine-learning 
algorithms, such as one-class Support Vector Machines [14] and Neural Networks, 
can be used as anomaly detectors. 
Following the suggestions from the ensemble detector, security experts would then 
look at suspicious places to verify if there any true IMSI catchers at a point in time. 
The feedback from the security experts is then given back to off-line learning part to 
update the models where the normal behavior was defined.  
At the present stage of our project no real data set has been yet collected from the 
mobile network and for illustration sake we did some experiments on the public 
available data set related to IMSI catcher detection from Aftenposten [15]. The data 
came from a handset while interacting with the mobile network and possibly with the 
IMSI catchers as well, and we cannot show the advantages of machine-learning in 
correlating different events from many different devices. However, the main objective 
of this experiment is to show that there is a potential of applying machine learning 
techniques to facilitate the detection process. 
For our simple experiment, from the data set we were interested in the frequency of 
the mode change between 2G and 3G. Our hypothesis is that the high value of the 
frequency would indicate abnormality in an area. 
We split the data by equal time slots and calculate the ratio between the number of 
2G and 3G in each time slot. We applied the anomaly detection algorithm named S-
H-ESD from Twitter [16] to detect abnormalities for those obtained ratio values. The 
result is shown in Figure 8. The three high spikes, which denote the abnormalities, 
indicate the possible presence of IMSI catcher 
 
  
 
 
Figure 8 Experiments on 2G/3G modes with Aftenposten data set 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper an innovative system for the detection of IMSI catcher is presented 
and described. It has a few advantages compared to the current existing solutions. 
First, according to our knowledge, most of the current IMSI catcher detectors, are  
located on the handset side, either as a dedicated device or an application that can be 
downloaded and installed in a regular mobile phone. They are intended for the users 
and put the responsibility of protecting confidentiality and privacy on the users’ 
shoulders. This may be both unfair and unmanageable for non-technical users. The 
proposed Machine Learning based IMSI catcher Detection system is network based 
and intended for mobile operators in the protection of their users. It is offering a more 
balanced and fair solution. Second, by being network based the proposed system will 
be able to carry out the data collection and detection at several areas simultaneously 
and hence improving the ability to detect an IMSI catcher. Third, the proposed 
detection system is using machine learning techniques and can hence learn and 
enhances itself more rapidly than the current IMSI catcher. However, as stated in the 
paper, there are also a few challenges such as determination of the area for the IMSI 
catcher anomaly, and collection of data, that have to be surmounted. The ImobSec 
project is also in very earlier phase and only data set from Aftenposten has been 
experimented. As future works, the proposed Machine Learning based IMSI catcher 
Detection system will be installed and deployed in the Telenor Norway mobile test 
network. Experiments will then be carried out with the introduction of the project’s 
IMSI catcher in the network. The lessons learned will then be applied to optimize and 
improve the system further. 
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